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Abstract
This paper presents a technique for approximating, up to any precision, the set of subgame-perfect
equilibria (SPE) in discounted repeated games. The process starts with a single hypercube approximation
of the set of SPE. Then the initial hypercube is gradually partitioned on to a set of smaller adjacent
hypercubes, while those hypercubes that cannot contain any point belonging to the set of SPE are
simultaneously withdrawn.
Whether a given hypercube can contain an equilibrium point is verified by an appropriate mathemat-
ical program. Three different formulations of the algorithm for both approximately computing the set of
SPE payoffs and extracting players’ strategies are then proposed: the first two that do not assume the
presence of an external coordination between players, and the third one that assumes a certain level of
coordination during game play for convexifying the set of continuation payoffs after any repeated game
history.
A special attention is paid to the question of extracting players’ strategies and their representability
in form of finite automata, an important feature for artificial agent systems.
1 Introduction
In multiagent systems (MAS) the notion of optimality cannot usually be applied to each agent separately.
In a MAS, each agent’s strategy (i.e., a plan specifying its behavior for every possible situation) can only
be considered optimal if it maximizes that agent’s utility function, subject to the constraints induced by the
respective strategies of the other agents – members of the same MAS. When each agent’s strategy is optimal
in this interdependent sense, the combination of agents’ strategies is called an equilibrium: as long as no
agent can individually improve its utility, all agents prefer to keep their strategies constant.
Given a MAS, a first problem consists of finding a compact yet sufficiently rich form of representing such
strategic interactions. Game theory provides a powerful framework for this. Repeated games (Fudenberg
and Tirole, 1991; Osborne and Rubinstein, 1999; Mailath and Samuelson, 2006) are an important game
theoretic formalism permitting modeling and studying the long-term strategic interactions between multiple
selfish optimizers.
Probably the most known example of a repeated game is Prisoner’s Dilemma whose example is shown
in Figure 1. In this game, there are two players, and each of them can make two actions: C or D. When
Player 1
Player 2
C D
C 2, 2 −1, 3
D 3,−1 0, 0
Figure 1: The payoff matrix of Prisoner’s Dilemma.
those players simultaneously perform their actions, the pair of actions induces a numerical payoff obtained
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by each player. The game then passes to the next stage, where it can be played again by the same pair of
players.
Game theory assumes that the goal of each player is to play optimally, i.e., to maximize its utility function
given the strategies of the other players. When the a priori information about all players’ strategies and
their real strategic preferences coincide, we talk about equilibria.
A pair of “Tit-For-Tat” (TFT) strategies is a well-known example of equilibrium in Repeated Prisoner’s
dilemma. TFT consists of starting by playing C. Then, each player should play the same action as the very
recent action played by its opponent. Indeed, such history dependent equilibrium brings to each player a
higher average payoff, than that of another, stationary, equilibrium of the repeated game (a pair of strategies
that prescribe to play D at every stage). However, an algorithmic construction of such strategies, given an
arbitrary repeated game, is challenging. For the case where the utility function is given by the average payoff,
Littman and Stone (2005) propose a simple and efficient algorithm that constructs equilibrium strategies in
two-player repeated games. On the other hand, when the players discount their future payoffs with a discount
factor, a pair of TFT strategies constitute an equilibrium only for certain values of the discount factor. Judd
et al. (2003) propose an approach for computing equilibria for different discount factors, but their approach
is limited to pure strategies, and, as we will discuss below, has several other important limitations.
In this paper, we present an algorithmic approach to the problem of computing equilibria in repeated
games when the future payoffs are discounted. Our approach is more general than that of Littman and Stone
(2005), because it allows an arbitrary discounting, and is free of four major limitations of the algorithm of
Judd et al. (2003). Furthermore, our algorithm finds only those strategies that can be adopted by artificial
agents. The latter are usually characterized by a finite time to compute their strategies and a finite memory
to implement them. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time when all these goals are achieved
simultaneously.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we present all necessary formal
notions and definitions, and we formally state the problem. In Section 3, we survey the previous work,
by pointing out its limitations. Section 4 is the principal part of this paper. In this section, we describe
our algorithms for approximately solving repeated games with discounting and for extracting equilibrium
strategies. In Section 5, we investigate the theoretical properties of the proposed algorithms. Section 6
contains an overview of some experimental results. We conclude in Section 7 with a short discussion and
summary remarks.
2 Problem Statement
2.1 Stage-Game
A stage-game is a tuple (N, {Ai}i∈N , {ri}i∈N ). In a stage-game, there is a finite set N , |N | ≡ n, of
individual players that act (play, or make their moves in the game) simultaneously. Player i ∈ N has a
finite set Ai of pure actions (or, simply, actions) in its disposal. When each player i among N chooses a
certain action ai ∈ Ai, the resulting vector a ≡ (a1, . . . , an) forms an action profile, which is then played, and
the corresponding stage-game outcome is realized. Each action profile belongs to the set of action profiles
A ≡ ×i∈NAi. A player specific payoff function ri specifies player i’s numerical reward for different game
outcomes. In a standard stage-game formulation, a bijection is typically assumed between the set of action
profiles and the set of game outcomes. In this case, a player’s payoff function can be defined as the mapping
ri : A 7→ R; also, this assumption permits, with no ambiguity, to interchangeably use the notions of action
profile and game outcome.
Given an action profile a, r(a) ≡ ×i∈Nri(a) is called a payoff profile. A mixed action αi of player i is a
probability distribution over its actions, i.e., αi ∈ ∆(Ai). A mixed action profile is a vector α ≡ (αi)i∈N .
We denote by αaii and α
a respectively the probability to play action ai by player i and the probability that
the outcome a will be realized by α, i.e., αa ≡∏i αaii . The payoff function can be extended to mixed action
profiles by taking expectations.
The set of players’ stage-game payoffs that can be generated by pure action profiles is denoted as
F ≡ {v ∈ Rn : ∃a ∈ A s.t. v = r(a)}.
The set F † of feasible payoffs is the convex hull of the set F , i.e., F † = coF .
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Let −i stand for “all players except i”. An equilibrium (or a Nash equilibrium) in a stage-game is a mixed
action profile α with the property that for each player i and for all α′i ∈ ∆(Ai), the following inequality
holds:
ri(α) ≥ ri(α′i, α−i),
where α ≡ (αi, α−i).
2.2 Repeated Game
In a repeated game, the same stage-game is played in periods t = 0, 1, 2, . . ., also called stages. At the
beginning of each stage, the players choose their actions that consequently form an action profile. Then they
simultaneously play this action profile, and collect the stage-game payoffs corresponding to the resulting
stage-game outcome. Then the repeated game passes to the next stage. When the number of game periods
is not known in advance and can be infinite, the repeated game is called infinite. This is the scope of the
present paper.
The set of the repeated game histories up to period t is given by Ht ≡ ×tA. The set of all possible
histories is given by H ≡ ⋃∞t=0Ht. For instance, a history ht ∈ Ht is a stream of outcomes realized in the
repeated game starting from period 0 up to period t− 1:
ht ≡ (a0, a1, a2, . . . , at−1).
A pure strategy of player i in the repeated game, σi, is a mapping from the set of all possible histories to
the set of player i’s actions, i.e., σi : H 7→ Ai. A mixed strategy of player i is a mapping σi : H 7→ ∆(Ai).
Σi denotes player i’s strategy space and Σ ≡ ×i∈NΣi denotes the set of strategy profiles.
A subgame of an original repeated game is a repeated game based on the same stage-game as the original
repeated game but started from a given history ht. Let a subgame be induced by a history ht. The behavior
of players in that subgame after a history hτ is identical to the behavior of players in the original repeated
game after the history ht · hτ , where ht · hτ ≡ (ht, hτ ) is a concatenation of two histories. Given a strategy
profile σ ∈ Σ and a history h ∈ H, we denote the subgame strategy profile induced by h as σ|h.
An outcome path in the repeated game is a possibly infinite stream of action profiles a ≡ (a0, a1, . . .). A
finite prefix of length t of an outcome path corresponds to a history in Ht+1. A strategy profile σ induces
an outcome path a(σ) ≡ (a0(σ), a1(σ), a2(σ), . . .) in the following way:
a0(σ) ∼ σ(∅),
a1(σ) ∼ σ(a0(σ)),
a2(σ) ∼ σ(a0(σ), a1(σ)),
. . . ,
where the notation at(σ) ∼ σ(ht) means that the outcome at is realized at stage t when the players were
playing according to the (mixed) action profile σ(ht). Obviously, in any two independent runs of the same
repeated game, the same pure strategy profile induces two identical outcome paths. On the contrary, at each
period t, the action profile at(σ) belonging to the outcome path induced by a mixed strategy profile σ is a
realization of the random process σ(ht).
In order to compare two repeated game strategies in terms of the utility induced by each strategy, one
needs a criterion that permits comparing infinite payoff streams. Given an infinite sequence of payoff profiles
v = (v0, v1, . . .), the discounted average payoff uγi (v) of this sequence for player i is given by
uγi (v) ≡ (1− γ)
∞∑
t=0
γtvti , (1)
where γ ∈ [0, 1) is the discount factor1. One way to interpret the discount factor is to view it as a probability
that the repeated game will continue at the next stage (similarly, (1−γ) can be viewed as the probability that
the repeated game stops after the current stage). This interpretation is especially convenient for artificial
agents, because a machine has a non-zero probability of fault at any moment of time.
1In the notation γt, t is the power of γ and not a superscript.
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Notice that in Equation (1), the sum of discounted payoffs is normalized by the factor (1 − γ). This
ensures that uγi (v) ∈ F † for any instance of v or γ. In other words, after the normalization, the player’s
discounted average payoffs can be compared both between them and with the payoffs of the stage-game.
Notice that because a sequence of payoff profiles, v, always corresponds to an outcome path, a, one can
interchangeably and with no ambiguity write uγi (v) and u
γ
i (a) referring to the same quantity.
To compare strategy profiles, a similar criterion can be defined. Let σ be a pure strategy profile and γ
be a discount factor. Then the utility of the strategy profile σ for player i can be defined as
uγi (σ) = (1− γ)
∞∑
t=0
γtri(a
t(σ)). (2)
As usually, when the players’ strategies are mixed, one should take an expectation over the realized outcome
paths.
We define a utility profile induced by strategy profile σ as uγ(σ) ≡ (uγi (σ))i∈N . As previously, due to the
normalization by the factor (1 − γ), for any σ ∈ Σ and for any γ ∈ [0, 1), uγ(σ) ∈ F †. Therefore, when
the meaning will be clear from the context, we will use the terms “payoff” and “payoff profile” to refer to,
respectively, utility and utility profile.
2.3 Subgame-Perfect Equilibrium
In order to act effectively in a given environment, any agent should have a strategy. When we talk about a
rational agent, this strategy has to be optimal in the sense that it should maximize that agent’s expected
payoff with respect to the known properties of the environment. In a single agent case, it can often be
assumed that the properties of the environment do not change in response to the actions executed by the
agent. In this case, it is said that the environment is stationary (Sutton and Barto, 1998). In order to act
optimally in a stationary environment, the agent has to solve the following optimization problem:
σi = max
ai∈Ai
Eaj∼αj [ri(ai, aj)] ,
where j denotes the environment as if it was a player repeatedly playing a mixed action αj .
When a rational agent plays a game with other rational agents, it has to optimize in the presence of
the other optimizing players. This makes the problem non-trivial, since an optimal strategy for one player
depends on the strategies chosen by the other players. In this context, if the opponents change their strategies,
the player’s strategy cannot generally retain optimality.
The concept of equilibrium describes strategies, in which all players’ strategic choices simultaneously
optimize with respect to each other. The strategy profile σ is an equilibrium (or a Nash equilibrium) if, for
each player i and its strategies σ′i ∈ Σi,
uγi (σ) ≥ uγi (σ′i, σ−i),
where σ ≡ (σi, σ−i). In other words, in the equilibrium, no player can unilaterally change its strategy so as
to augment its own payoff.
Another notion is important when we consider strategies in repeated games. This is the notion of
sequential rationality or, if applied to the strategy profiles, of subgame-perfection. A strategy profile σ is a
subgame-perfect equilibrium (SPE) in the repeated game, if for all histories h ∈ H, the subgame strategy
profile σ|h is an equilibrium in the subgame.
Let us first informally explain why, in the repeated games, the notion of subgame-perfection is of such a
high importance. Consider a grim trigger strategy. This strategy is similar to TFT in that the two players
start by playing C at the first period. Then grim trigger prescribes playing C until any player plays D, in
which case the strategy prescribes playing D forever. Let the game be as shown in Figure 2. Observe that
in this game, the reason why each player would prefer to play the cooperative action C while its opponent
plays C is that the profile of two grim trigger strategies is an equilibrium when γ is close enough to 1. Indeed,
let Player 1 consider a possibility of deviation to the action D whenever Player 2 is supposed to play C.
Player 1 is informed that according to the strategy profile σ (which is a profile of two grim trigger strategies)
starting from the next period, Player 2 will play D infinitely often. Thus, when γ is sufficiently close to 1,
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Player 1
Player 2
C D
C 2, 2 −1, 3
D 3,−1 0,−2
Figure 2: A game in which a profile of two grim trigger strategies is not a subgame-perfect equilibrium.
after only one stage, at which the profile (D,D) is played following the deviation, Player 1 looses all the
additional gain it obtains owing to the deviation.
Now, let us suppose that Player 1 still decides to deviate after a certain history ht. It plays D whenever
Player 2 plays C and collects the payoff of 3 instead of 2. The repeated game enters into the subgame induced
by the history ht+1 ≡ (ht, (D,C)). Now, according to the strategy profile σ|ht+1 , Player 2 is supposed to
play D forever and “let the punishment happen”. However, observe the payoffs of Player 2. If Player 2
plays D forever, as prescribed by the Nash equilibrium, it certainly obtains the average payoff of −2 in the
subgame, because the rational opponent (Player 1) will optimize with respect to this strategy. But if Player 2
continues playing C, it obtains the average playoff of −1 in the subgame, while its opponent, the deviator,
will continue enjoying the payoff of 3 at each subsequent period. As one can see, even if after the equilibrium
histories the profile of two grim trigger strategies constitutes an equilibrium in the game shown in Figure 2,
it is a non-equilibrium in an out-of-equilibrium subgame. Thus, due to this simple example, it becomes clear
why, in order to implement equilibria in practice, one needs to have recourse to subgame-perfect equilibria:
while one rational player should have no incentive to deviate being informed about the strategy prescribed to
the opponents (the property of Nash equilibrium), the rational opponents, in turn, need to have incentives to
follow their prescribed strategies after that player’s eventual deviation (the property of subgame-perfection).
A subgame-perfect equilibrium always exists. To see this, observe first that according to Nash (1950a)
in any stage-game, there exists an equilibrium. It is then sufficient to notice that any strategy profile that
prescribes playing, after any history, a certain Nash equilibrium of the stage-game is a subgame-perfect
equilibrium.
2.4 Strategy Profile Automata
By its definition, a player’s strategy is a mapping from an infinite set of histories into the set of player’s
actions. In order to construct a strategy for an artificial agent (which is usually bounded in terms of memory
and performance) one needs a way to specify strategies by means of finite representations.
Intuitively, one can see that, given a strategy profile σ, two different histories ht and hτ can induce
identical continuation strategy profiles, i.e., σ|ht = σ|hτ . For example, in the case of TFT strategy,
agents will have the same continuation strategy both after the history ((C,C), (C,C)) and after the his-
tory ((D,C), (C,D), (C,C)). One can put all such histories into the same equivalence class. If one views
these equivalence classes of histories as players’ states, then a strategy profile can be viewed as an automaton.
Let M ≡ (Q, q0, f, τ) be an automaton implementation of a strategy profile σ. It consists of a set of
states Q, with the initial state q0 ∈ Q; of a profile of decision functions f ≡ ×i∈Nfi, where the decision
function of player i, fi : Q 7→ ∆(Ai), associates mixed actions with states; and of a transition function
τ : Q × A 7→ Q, which identifies the next state of the automaton given the current state and the action
profile played in the current state.
Let M be an automaton. In order to demonstrate how M induces a strategy profile, one can first
recursively define τ(q, ht), the transition function specifying the next state of the automaton given its initial
state q and a history ht that starts in q, as{
τ(q, ht) ≡ τ(τ(q, ht−1), at−1),
τ(q, h1) ≡ τ(q, a0).
With the above definition in hand, one can define σi, the strategy of player i induced by the automaton M ,
as {
σi(∅) ≡ fi(q0),
σi(h
t) ≡ fi(τ(q0, ht)).
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An example of a strategy profile implemented as an automaton is shown in Figure 3. This automaton
implements the profile of two grim trigger strategies. The circles are the states of the automaton. The
arrows are the transitions between the corresponding states; they are labeled with outcomes. The states are
labeled with the action profiles prescribed by the profiles of decision functions.
CC, DD,
),( CC
),(),(),( DDCDDC ∨∨
),(),(),(),( DDCDDCCC ∨∨∨
Figure 3: An example of an automaton implementing a profile of two grim trigger strategies. The circles are
the states of the automaton; they are labeled with the action profiles prescribed by the profiles of decision
functions. The arrows are the transitions between the corresponding states; they are labeled with outcomes.
Since any automaton induces a strategy profile, any two automata can be compared in terms of the
utility they bring to the players. Let an automaton M induce a strategy profile σ. The utility uγi (M) of the
automaton M for player i is then equal to uγi (σ), where u
γ
i (σ) is given by Equation (2).
Let |M | denote the number of states of automaton M . If the value |M | is finite, such automaton is called
a finite automaton; otherwise the automaton is called infinite. In MAS, most of the time, we are interested
in finite automata, because artificial agents always have a finite memory to stock their strategies and a finite
processing power to construct them.
Any finite automaton induces a strategy profile, however not any strategy profile can be represented using
finite automata. Kalai and Stanford (1988) demonstrated that any SPE can be approximated with a finite
automaton. First of all, they defined the notion of an approximate SPE. For an approximation factor  > 0,
a strategy profile σ ∈ Σ is an -equilibrium in a repeated game, if for each player i and for all σ′i ∈ Σi,
uγi (σ) ≥ uγi (σ′i, σ−i) − , where σ ≡ (σi, σ−i). A strategy profile σ ∈ Σ is a subgame-perfect -equilibrium
(SPE) in the repeated game, if for all histories h ∈ H, the subgame strategy profile σ|h is an -equilibrium
in the subgame induced by h. Kalai and Stanford (1988) then proved the following theorem:
Theorem 1 (Kalai and Stanford (1988)). Consider a repeated game with the discount factor γ and the
approximation factor . For any subgame-perfect equilibrium σ, there exists a finite automaton M with the
property that |uγi (σ)− uγi (M)| <  for all i, and such that M induces a subgame-perfect -equilibrium.
2.5 Problem Statement
Let Uγ ⊂ Rn be the set of all SPE payoff profiles in a repeated game with the discount factor γ. Let Σγ, ⊆ Σ
be the set of all SPE strategy profiles in a repeated game with the discount factor γ and the approximation
factor .
In this paper, the problem of an approximate subgame-perfect equilibrium computation is stated as
follows: find a set W ⊇ Uγ with the property that for any v ∈ W , one can find a finite automaton M
inducing a strategy profile σ ∈ Σγ,, such that for all i, vi − uγi (M) ≤ .
3 Previous Work
The work on equilibrium computation can be categorized into three main groups. For the algorithms of
the first group, the problem consists in computing one or several stationary equilibria (or -equilibria) given
a payoff matrix. The discount factor is implicitly assumed to be equal to zero (Lemke and Howson, 1964;
McKelvey and McLennan, 1996; von Stengel, 2002; Chen et al., 2006; Porter et al., 2008). For example, in
the repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma from Figure 1, the algorithms of the first group will only find the stationary
equilibrium,
σi(h) ≡ D, ∀i, ∀h,
whose payoff profile is (0, 0).
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The algorithms belonging to the second group represent the other extremity. They assume the discount
factor to be arbitrarily close to 1. For instance, in two-player repeated games, this permits obtaining a
polynomially fast algorithm for constructing automata inducing equilibrium strategy profiles (Littman and
Stone, 2005). Indeed, when γ tends to 1, the set of SPE payoff profiles Uγ converges to the following set:
F ∗ ≡ {v ∈ F † : vi ≥ vi, ∀i},
where the minmax payoff vi of player i is defined as
vi ≡ min
α−i∈×j 6=i ∆(Aj)
max
ai∈Ai
ri(ai, α−i).
The set F ∗ is called the set of feasible and individually rational payoff profiles. It is the smallest possible set
that can be guaranteed to entirely contain the set of all SPE payoff profiles in any repeated game. Having in
hand the set of SPE payoff profiles, in order to construct an SPE strategy profile, it is remaining to choose
any point v ∈ F ∗ and to construct an automaton having a structure similar to TFT. More precisely, in
this automaton, there will be one “in-equilibrium” (or, “cooperative”) cycle that generates v as an average
payoff profile, and two out-of-equilibrium (or, “punishment”) cycles, one for each player, where the deviator
obtains at most its minmax payoff during a finite number of periods (see Littman and Stone (2005) for more
details).
If the discount factor is viewed as the probability that the repeated game will be continued by the same set
of players, it usually cannot be arbitrarily modified (e.g., moved closer to 1). The third group of algorithms
for computing SPE payoffs and strategies aims at finding a solution by assuming that the discount factor γ
is a fixed given value between 0 and 1 (Cronshaw and Luenberger, 1994; Cronshaw, 1997; Judd et al., 2003).
These algorithms are based on the concept of self-generating sets, introduced by Abreu et al. (1990).
Let us formally develop the idea of self-generation in application to the problem of computing the set of
pure SPE payoff profiles. Given a strategy profile σ, one can rewrite Equation (2) as follows:
uγi (σ) ≡ (1− γ)
∞∑
t=0
γtri(a
t(σ))
= (1− γ)ri(a0(σ)) + γ
[ ∞∑
t=1
γt−1ri(at(σ))
]
= (1− γ)ri(a0(σ)) + γuγi (σ|a0(σ)).
Let uγi (ai, σ|ht) denote player i’s utility for playing action ai at history ht given the strategy profile σ. Let
a¯ ≡ (a¯i, a¯−i) be the action profile prescribed by strategy profile σ at history ht, i.e., a¯ ≡ σ(ht) ≡ σ|ht(∅).
For all ai ∈ Ai one can write,
uγi (ai, σ|ht) = (1− γ)ri(ai, a¯−i) + γuγi (σ|ht+1), (3)
where ht+1 ≡ ht · a is obtained as a concatenation of the history ht and the action profile a ≡ (ai, a¯−i); and
uγi (σ|ht+1) represents the so-called continuation promise of the strategy σ after the history (ht · a).
Therefore, at each period of the repeated game, player i has a choice between different actions ai ∈ Ai,
each having a particular utility vi. Consequently, each period of the repeated game can be represented as
a certain stage-game, whose payoffs are equal to the original stage-game payoffs augmented by the corre-
sponding continuation promises. Let us call such new stage-game an augmented game. For instance, let the
stage-game of the repeated game be as shown in Figure 4. Given a strategy profile σ and a history ht, the
Player 1
Player 2
C D
C r(C,C) r(C,D)
D r(D,C) r(D,D)
Figure 4: A generic stage-game.
augmented game corresponding to this stage-game is shown in Figure 5.
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Player 1
Player 2
C D
C (1− γ)r(C,C) + γuγ(σ|ht·(C,C)) (1− γ)r(C,D) + γuγ(σ|ht·(C,D))
D (1− γ)r(D,C) + γuγ(σ|ht·(D,C)) (1− γ)r(D,D) + γuγ(σ|ht·(D,D))
Figure 5: An augmented game for the generic stage-game from Figure 4.
By reformulating the definition of subgame-perfect equilibrium, the strategy profile σ is an SPE, if and
only if it induces an equilibrium mixed action profile in the augmented game after any history.
Let V γ denote the set of pure action subgame-perfect equilibrium payoff profiles one wants to identify.
Recall Equation (3): at a history ht, in order to make part of a subgame-perfect equilibrium strategy,
action ai has to be “supported” by a certain continuation promise u
γ
i (σ|ht+1), where ht+1 ≡ ht · (ai, a¯−i) and
(a¯i, a¯−i) ≡ σ(ht). By the property of subgame-perfection, this must hold after any history. Therefore, if ai
does make part of a certain subgame-perfect equilibrium σ at the history ht, then uγi (σ|ht+1) has to belong
to V γ , as well as uγi (ai, σ|ht). This self-referential property of subgame-perfect equilibrium suggests a way
by which one can find V γ .
Let BRi(α) denote a stationary best response of player i to the mixed action profile α ≡ (αi, α−i), i.e.,
BRi(α) ≡ max
ai∈Ai
ri(ai, α−i).
The analysis focuses on the map Bγ defined on a set W ⊂ Rn:
Bγ(W ) ≡
⋃
(a,w)∈A×W
(1− γ)r(a) + γw,
where w has to verify for all i:
(1− γ)ri(a) + γwi − (1− γ)ri(BRi(a), a−i)− γwi ≥ 0,
and wi ≡ infw∈W wi. Abreu et al. (1990) show that the largest fixed point of Bγ(W ) is V γ .
Any numerical implementation of Bγ(W ) requires an efficient representation of the set W in a machine.
Judd et al. (2003) use convex sets in order to approximate both W and Bγ(W ) as an intersection of a finite
number of hyperplanes. Each application of Bγ(W ) is then reduced to solving a simple linear program. The
algorithm starts with a set W ∈ Rn that is guaranteed to entirely contain V γ . Then it iteratively modifies
W as W ← Bγ(W ) until convergence. We omit further details: the interested reader can refer to Judd et al.
(2003).
The approach of Judd et al. (2003) has, however, several important limitations:
1. It assumes the existence of at least one pure action equilibrium in the stage-game;
2. It permits computing only pure action SPE strategy profiles;
3. It cannot find SPE strategy profiles implementable by finite automata with given precision;
4. It can only be naturally applicable if the set of SPE payoff profiles is convex. In practice, this is
often not the case. This means that in order to be capable of adopting strategies computed by the
algorithm, the players need to have a way to convexify the set of continuation promises by randomizing
between them. This can be done, for example, by means of a special communication protocol (e.g.,
jointly controlled lotteries by Aumann et al. (1995)) or by using a public correlating device (Mailath
and Samuelson, 2006).
In the next section, we present three different formulations of our algorithm for solving the problem of an
approximate SPE computation, as it was stated in Section 2. The first formulation is only free of the last two
limitations of the approach of Judd et al. (2003). The second formulation is free of all four limitations, but
it is not guaranteed to find a set containing all mixed strategy SPE payoff profiles. The third version of the
algorithm, in turn, finds a set containing all (pure and mixed) SPE payoff profiles. However, it accomplishes
this for the sake of convexifying the set of continuation promises, i.e., has the fourth limitation.
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4 The Algorithms
The fixed point property of the map Bγ and its relation to the set of SPE payoff profiles can be used
to approximate the latter. Indeed, according to Abreu et al. (1990), if (i) for a certain set W we have
Bγ(W ) = W and (ii) W is the largest such set, then W = Uγ . The idea is to start by a certain set W that
is guaranteed to entirely contain Uγ , and then to iteratively eliminate all those points w′ ∈ W for which
@(w,α) ∈W ×∆(A1)× . . .×∆(An), such that,
(1) w′ = (1− γ)r(α) + γw, and,
(2) (1− γ)ri(α) + γwi − (1− γ)ri(BRi(α), α−i)− γwi ≥ 0, ∀i. (4)
Algorithm 1 outlines the basic structure for three different formulations that will be defined in the
following subsections. The algorithm starts with an initial approximation W of the set of SPE payoff
profiles Uγ . The set W is represented by a union of disjoint hypercubes belonging to the set C. Each
hypercube c ∈ C is identified by its origin oc ∈ Rn and by the side length l, the same for all hypercubes.
Initially, C contains only one hypercube c, whose origin oc is set to be a vector (r)i∈N ; the side length l is
set to be l = r¯ − r, where r ≡ mina,i ri(a) and r¯ ≡ maxa,i ri(a). I.e., W entirely contains Uγ .
Input: r, a payoff matrix; γ a discount factor; , an approximation factor.
1: Let l ≡ r¯ − r and oc ≡ (r)i∈N ;
2: Set C ← {(oc, l)};
3: loop
4: Set AllCubesCompleted← True;
5: Set NoCubeWithdrawn← True;
6: for each c ≡ (oc, l) ∈ C do
7: Let wi ≡ minc∈C oci ;
8: Set w ← (wi)i∈N ;
9: if CubeSupported(c, C, w) is False then
10: Set C ← C\{c};
11: if C = ∅ then
12: return False;
13: Set NoCubeWithdrawn← False;
14: else
15: if CubeCompleted(c) is False then
16: Set AllCubesCompleted← False;
17: if NoCubeWithdrawn is True then
18: if AllCubesCompleted is False then
19: Set C ← SplitCubes(C);
20: else
21: return C.
Algorithm 1: The basic structure for all proposed algorithms.
Each iteration of Algorithm 1 consists of verifying, for each hypercube c ∈ C, whether it has to be
eliminated from the set C (procedure CubeSupported). If c does not contain any point w′ satisfying the
conditions of Equation (4), this hypercube is withdrawn from the set C. If, by the end of a certain iteration,
no hypercube was withdrawn, each remaining hypercube is split into 2n disjoint hypercubes with side l/2
(procedure SplitCubes). The process continues until, for each remaining hypercube, a certain stopping
criterion is satisfied (procedure CubeCompleted).
4.1 Pure Strategy Equilibria
For the case where the goal is to only approximate pure action equilibria, the definition of the procedure
CubeSupported is given in Algorithm 2. In this algorithm, the set of hyperrectangular clusters, S, is
obtained from the set of hypercubes, C, by finding a smaller set, such that the union of its elements is equal
to the union of the elements of C (procedure GetClusters). Each s ∈ S is identified by its origin os ∈ Rn
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Input: c ≡ (oc, l), a hypercube; C, a set of hypercubes; w a vector of payoffs.
1: S ← GetClusters(C)
2: for each s ≡ (os, ls) ∈ S do
3: for each a ∈ A do
4: Solve the following linear constraint satisfaction problem:
Decision variables: w ∈ Rn and w′ ∈ Rn;
Subject to constraints:
(1) w′ = (1− γ)r(a) + γw;
For all i:
(2) (1− γ)ri(a) + γwi − (1− γ)ri(BRi(a), a−i)− γwi ≥ 0,
(3) osi ≤ wi ≤ os + lsi ,
(4) oci ≤ w′i ≤ oci + l;
5: if a pair (w,w′) satisfying the constraints is found then
6: return (a,w);
7: return False.
Algorithm 2: CubeSupported for pure strategies. The procedure verifies whether a given hypercube c
has to be kept in the set of hypercubes C. If yes, CubeSupported returns a pure action profile and a
continuation promise. Otherwise the procedure returns False.
and by the vector of side lengths ls ∈ Rn. The clusterization of the set C is done to speed up the algorithm
in practice. In our experiments, we used a simple greedy algorithm to identify hyperrectangles. Of course,
one can always define S ≡ C. In this case, for each c ≡ (oc, l) ∈ C, there will be exactly one s ∈ S, such
that s ≡ (oc, (l)i∈N ).
The linear constraint satisfaction program of Algorithm 2 can be solved by any linear program solver.
We used CPLEX (IBM, Corp., 2009) together with OptimJ (ATEJI, 2009) for solving all mathematical
programs defined in this paper.
If the conditions of Equation (4) are verified, and c has to be kept in C, the CubeSupported procedure
of Algorithm 2 returns a pure action profile a and a payoff profile w such that (1−γ)r(a) +γw ≡ w′ belongs
to the hypercube c. Otherwise, the procedure returns False.
4.2 Mixed Strategy Equilibria
Computing the set of all equilibria (i.e., pure action and mixed action, stationary and non stationary) is a
more challenging task. To the best of our knowledge, there is no algorithm capable of at least approximately
solving this problem. The previous pure strategy case was greatly simplified by two circumstances:
1. It is possible to enumerate pure action profiles one by one in order to test all possibilities to satisfy the
two conditions of Equation (4).
2. Any deviation of player i from the recommended (by the equilibrium strategy profile) action profile a ≡
(ai, a−i) in a case, where ai /∈ {a′i : r(a′i, a−i) = ri(BRi(a), a−i)} is immediately detected by the other
players. This makes possible to enforce the condition (2) of Equation (4) in practice.
When the action profiles, which strategy profiles can recommend, are allowed to be mixed, their one
by one enumeration is impossible. Furthermore, deviations from mixed actions can only be detected if the
deviation is done in favor of an out-of-the-support action. In game theory, the support of a mixed action αi
is a set Aαii ⊆ Ai, which contains all pure actions to which αi assigns a non-zero probability. Therefore, if
player i plays an action ai /∈ Aαii , whenever it is supposed to play a mixed action αi, only in this case the
other players can immediately detect the deviation. Deviations that only involve the actions in the support
of αi cannot be detected.
We solve the two aforementioned problems in the following way. We first define a special mixed integer
program (MIP). We then let the solver decide on which actions to be included into the mixed action support
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of each player, and what probability has to be assigned to those actions. The MIP has to be solved for all
agents simultaneously. Because the goal is to only satisfy the constraints of Equation (4), the presence of a
particular objective function in the MIP is not generally necessary. In our implementation, we have chosen
an objective to minimize the sum of the cardinalities of the supports. This means that, when possible, the
preference is given to pure action strategies.
Player i is only willing to randomize according to a mixture αi, if it is indifferent over the pure actions in
the support of the mixture. The technique is to specify different continuation promises for different actions
in the support of the mixture, such that the utility of each action remains bounded by the dimensions of the
hypercube. Algorithm 3 defines the procedure CubeSupported for the case, where the set of continuation
promises is represented by the union of hyperrectangular clusters.
For each hyperrectangular cluster, s, containing possible continuations, Algorithm 3 verifies whether, for
the given hypercube c, one can find a mixed action profile α ≡ (αi, α−i), such that for all i and for all
ai ∈ Aαii , (1− γ)ri(α) + γwi(ai) ≡ w′i(ai) lies between osi and osi + lsi . This will satisfy the first condition of
Equation (4). To satisfy the second condition, the choice of the mixed action and of the continuation payoffs
has to be such that, for all i ∈ N and for all ai /∈ Aαii , wi ≤ wi(ai) ≤ wi + l, to make any out-of-the-support
deviation approximately unprofitable.
Observe that in the MIP of Algorithm 3, we assign the continuation payoffs wi(ai) to pure actions and
not to pure action profiles (as, for example, can follow from the definition of an augmented game). This
permits avoiding the non-linear term α
a−i
−i wi(ai, a−i) in the constraint (3) of the MIP. One can do this,
without missing any continuation promise belonging to the cluster, thanks to the rectangular structure of
the latter: for any action profile a ≡ (a1, . . . , an) realized during the repeated game play, the corresponding
continuation payoff profile (w1(a1), . . . , wn(an)) will always be found inside, or on the boundary of, a certain
hyperrectangle. This assures that the continuation payoff profiles belong to W .
In Algorithm 3, the required indifference of player i between the actions in the support of the mixed
action αi is (approximately) secured by the constraint (4) of the MIP. Observe that in an optimal solution of
the MIP, the binary variables yaii , known as indicator variables, can only be equal to 1 if ai is in the support
of αi. Therefore, according to the constraint (4), each w
′
i(ai) is either bounded by the dimensions of the
hypercube, if ai ∈ Aαii , or is below the origin of the hypercube, otherwise.
Notice that the MIP of Algorithm 3 is only linear in the case of two players. For more than two players,
the problem becomes non-linear due to the fact that α−i is now given by a product of decision variables αj ,
for all j ∈ N\{i}. For three players, for example, such optimization problem becomes a mixed integer
quadratically constrained program (MIQCP); such optimization problems are generally very difficult as they
combine two kinds of non-convexities: integer variables and non-convex quadratic constraints (Saxena et al.,
2008).
The fact that all continuation payoff profiles are contained within one cluster makes the optimization
problem easier to solve; however, such an approach also restricts the set of equilibria by allowing only those
SPE, for which the continuation payoffs are always contained within a certain cluster. Nevertheless, the
solutions that can be computed by Algorithm 3 include, among others, all pure strategy SPE (because,
in this case, the continuation payoff profile is a unique point belonging to a certain cluster) as well as all
stationary mixed strategy SPE (because for any i and any stationary SPE payoff w′i(ai), belonging to a certain
hypercube, the continuation payoff wi(ai) belongs to the same hypercube). A more general formulation of the
MIP could, for example, allow the continuations for different action profiles to belong to different clusters.
The task of selecting a particular cluster for wi(a), for all i, can also be left to the solver. This would,
however, again result in a non-linear MIP, because, now, the constraint (3) would look as follows,
w′i(ai) =
∑
a−i
α
a−i
−i ((1− γ)ri(ai, a−i) + γwi(ai, a−i)),
where wi(ai, a−i), the continuation payoff assigned to an action profile a ≡ (ai, a−i), is bounded by the
dimensions of a certain cluster.
There is a way to modify Algorithm 3 so as to keep in W all SPE payoff profiles while preserving the
linearity of the MIP, at least for two-player repeated games. This can be achieved by assuming a certain
level of coordination between players during the game play. This is the subject of the next subsection.
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Input: c ≡ (oc, l), a hypercube; C, a set of hypercubes; w a vector of payoffs.
1: S ← GetClusters(C)
2: for each s ≡ (os, ls) ∈ S do
3: Solve the following mixed integer program:
Decision variables: wi(ai) ∈ R, w′i(ai) ∈ R, yaii ∈ {0, 1}, αaii ∈ [0, 1] for all i ∈ {1, 2} and for all
ai ∈ Ai;
Objective function: min f ≡∑i∑ai yaii ;
Subject to constraints:
For all i:
(1)
∑
ai
αaii = 1;
For all i and for all ai ∈ Ai:
(2) αaii ≤ yaii ,
(3) w′i(ai) = (1− γ)
∑
a−i α
a−i
−i ri(ai, a−i) + γwi(ai),
(4) ociy
ai
i ≤ w′i(ai) ≤ lyaii + oci ,
(5) wi − wiyaii + osiyaii ≤ wi(ai) ≤ (wi + l)− (wi + l)yaii + (osi + lsi )yaii ;
4: if a solution is found then
5: return wi(ai) and α
ai
i for all i ∈ {1, 2} and for all ai ∈ Ai;
6: return False.
Algorithm 3: CubeSupported for mixed strategies. The procedure verifies whether a given hypercube c
has to be kept in the set of hypercubes C. If yes, CubeSupported returns a mixed action profile α and
the corresponding continuation promise payoffs for each pure action in the support of αi. Otherwise the
procedure returns False.
4.3 Public Correlation
A mixed SPE strategy profile σ, after each history h, suggests to the players a certain mixed action profile α
and has a certain value w(α) associated with it. More precisely, w(α) is an expected continuation promise
for playing mixed action α at history h, such that uγ(σ|h) ≡ w′ = (1 − γ)r(α) + γw(α). Also, σ|h induces
a certain continuation payoff profile w(a) for each outcome a realized at h. Because σ is an SPE, every
such w(a) belongs to Uγ , the set of SPE payoff profiles. However, w(α) does not necessarily belongs to Uγ ,
because w(α) is a mixture
∑
a∈A α
aw(a). On the other hand, for any α, w(α) does belong to coUγ , the
convex hull of the set of SPE payoff profiles.
Let us assume that one can select, as a continuation payoff profile, any payoff profile from coW . In the
MIP of the CubeSupported procedure, one can, therefore, associate continuation payoffs wi with player i’s
actions, and not with action profiles. This would permit avoiding the previously seen non-linearity when
we allowed the continuations to belong to different hypercubes. To achieve this, one can rewrite w(α) as
(wi(α))i∈N , where wi(α) ≡
∑
ai
αaii wi(ai|α) and wi(ai|α) ≡
∑
a′∈A:a′i=ai wi(a
′)
∏
j∈N\{i} α
a′j
j . Let w
′ ≡
(w′i)i∈N be an SPE payoff profile and let one want to identify α and w(α) in support of w
′. If ai ∈ Aαii ,
then, for all i,
w′i = (1− γ)ri(ai|α) + γwi(ai|α),
where ri(ai|α) ≡
∑
a′∈A:a′i=ai ri(a
′)
∏
j∈N\{i} α
a′j
j . For two players, the right-hand expression for w
′
i is linear.
Furthermore, for any choice of α, the payoff profile obtained as (wi(ai|α))i∈N is a point in Rn that belongs
to coW . One can now modify the optimization problem of Algorithm 3 so as to keep inside the convex hull
of W any point (wi(ai))i∈N , such that ai ∈ Aαii , ∀i. In doing so, we are guaranteed to keep in W all possible
SPE payoff profiles.
A convexification of the set of continuation payoff profiles can be done in different ways, one of which
is public correlation. A repeated game with public correlation is a repeated game, such that in every stage-
game, a realization ω ∈ (0, 1] of a public random variable is first drawn, which is observed by all players,
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and then each player chooses an action. The public signal ω can be generated by a certain public corre-
lating device (Mailath and Samuelson, 2006). This device has to be capable of generating instances of a
given random variable and to be unbiased, i.e., indifferent with regard to the repeated game outcomes. A
public correlating device can be simulated by a special communication protocol, such as a jointly controlled
lottery (Aumann et al., 1995).
Let σ be an SPE strategy profile that suggests playing a mixed action profile α at ht and promises a
continuation payoff profile w(a) for each a ∈ A. If, for all a, w(a) ∈ Uγ , no public correlation is necessary:
for any possible ht+1 ≡ ht ·a, there exists σ|ht+1 ∈ Σγ , such that uγ(σ|ht+1) = w(a). Now, let us suppose that
after playing a mixed action α at ht, an outcome a has been realized, such that w(a) ∈ coUγ\Uγ . In this
case, one cannot find any strategy σ|ht+1 ∈ Σγ , such that uγ(σ|ht+1) = w(a). On the other hand, by using
a correlating device during the game play, the players can obtain, in expectation, the continuation payoff
profile w(a) as a convex combination of K points wk ∈ Uγ . I.e., there exist K non-negative real numbers ρk
with the property that
∑K
k=1 ρkwk = w(a) and
∑K
k=1 ρk = 1.
Let a public correlating device be available and capable of generating a uniformly distributed signal
ω ∈ (0, 1] when needed. Define ρ0 = 0. If ω ∈
(∑k−1
j=0 ρj ,
∑k
k=0 ρj
]
for some k = 1, . . . ,K, then σ|ht+1 is set
to be a σ ∈ Σγ such that uγ(σ) = wk. By so doing, any SPE payoff profile v, computed assuming that the
set of continuation payoff profiles is convex, can in practice be induced by a certain SPE strategy profile σ.
To achieve this, the transition function of the automaton implementation of σ has to be modified into a
mapping f : Q × A × (0, 1] 7→ Q, such that f(q, a, w) specifies the next state of the automaton, given that
the outcome a ∈ A was first realized in the current state q ∈ Q and then ω ∈ (0, 1] was drawn.
4.3.1 The Algorithm
Algorithm 4 contains the definition of the CubeSupported procedure that convexifies the set of continuation
promises. The definition is given for two players, i.e., N ≡ {1, 2}. The procedure first identifies coW , the
smallest convex set containing all hypercubes of the set C (procedure GetHalfplanes). This convex set
is represented as a set P of half-planes. Each element p ∈ P ⊂ R3 is a vector p ≡ (φp, ψp, λp), such that
the inequality φpx + ψpy ≤ λp identifies a half-plane in a two-dimensional space. The intersection of these
half-planes gives coW . In our experiments, in order to construct the set P from the set C, we used the
Graham scan, an efficient technique to identify the boundary points of the convex hull of a set (Graham,
1972).
The procedure CubeSupported defined in Algorithm 4 differs from that of Algorithm 3 in the following
aspects. It does not compute clusters and, consequently, does not iterate. Instead, it convexifies the set W
and searches for continuation promises for the hypercube c inside coW . The definition of the MIP is
also different. New indicator variables, za1,a2 , for all pairs (a1, a2) ∈ A1 × A2, are introduced. The new
constraint (6), jointly with the modified objective function, verify that za1,a2 is only equal to 1 whenever
both ya11 and y
a2
2 are equal to 1. In other words, z
a1,a2 = 1, only if a1 ∈ Aα11 and a2 ∈ Aα22 . Another new
constraint (7) verifies that (w1(a1), w2(a2)), the continuation promise payoff profile, belongs to coW if and
only if (a1, a2) ∈ Aα11 × Aα22 . Notice that in the constraint (7), M stands for a sufficiently large number.
In constrained optimization, this is a standard technique for relaxing a given constraint by using binary
indicator variables.
4.4 Computing Strategies
Algorithm 1 returns the set of hypercubes C, such that the union of these hypercubes gives W , a set that
contains Uγ . Intuitively, each hypercube represents all those strategy profiles that induce similar payoff
profiles. Therefore, one can view hypercubes as states of an automaton. Pick a point v ∈ W . Algorithm 5
constructs an automaton M that implements a strategy profile σ that approximately induces the payoff
profile v.
4.5 Stopping Criterion
The values of the flags NoCubeWithdrawn and AllCubesCompleted determine whether the basic
algorithm (Algorithm 1) should stop and return the set W approximating the set of SPE payoff profiles
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Input: c ≡ (oc, l), a hypercube; C, a set of hypercubes.
1: P ← GetHalfplanes(C)
2: Solve the following mixed integer linear optimization problem:
Decision variables: wi(ai) ∈ R, w′i(ai) ∈ R, yaii ∈ {0, 1}, αaii ∈ [0, 1] for all i ∈ {1, 2} and for all
ai ∈ Ai; za1,a2 ∈ {0, 1} for all pairs (a1, a2) ∈ A1 ×A2.
Objective function: min f ≡∑(a1,a2)∈A1×A2 za1,a2 .
Subject to constraints:
For all i ∈ {1, 2}:
(1)
∑
ai
αaii = 1;
For all i ∈ {1, 2} and for all ai ∈ Ai:
(2) αaii ≤ yaii ,
(3) w′i(ai) = (1− γ)
∑
a−i α−i(a−i)ri(ai, a−i) + γwi(ai),
(4) ociy
ai
i ≤ w′i(ai) ≤ lyaii + oci ,
(5) wi − wiyaii ≤ wi(ai) ≤ (wi + l)− (wi + l)yaii + r¯yaii ;
For all a1 ∈ A1 and for all a2 ∈ A2:
(6) ya11 + y
a2
2 ≤ za1,a2 + 1;
For all p ≡ (φp, ψp, λp) ∈ P and for all pairs (a1, a2) ∈ A1 ×A2:
(7) φpw1(a1) + ψ
pw2(a2) ≤ λpza1,a2 +M −Mza1,a2 .
3: if a solution is found then
4: return wi(ai) and α
ai
i for all i ∈ {1, 2} and for all ai ∈ Ai.
5: return False
Algorithm 4: CubeSupported for mixed actions and public correlation. The procedure verifies whether a
given hypercube c has to be kept in the set of hypercubes C. If c has to be kept in C, CubeSupported
returns a mixed action profile and the corresponding continuation promise payoffs for each pure action in
the support of mixed actions. Otherwise the procedure returns False.
(and entirely containing it). At the end of each algorithm’s iteration, the flag AllCubesCompleted is
only True, if for none of the remaining hypercubes c ∈ C, CubeCompleted(c) is False. The procedure
CubeCompleted, in turn, verifies, for hypercube c, that the two conditions of the problem stated in
Subsection 2.5 are satisfied, namely:
1. For any v ∈W , the strategy profile σ, implemented by the automaton M , constructed by Algorithm 5,
induces the payoff profile uγ(σ), such that, for all i, vi − uγi (σ) ≤ ,
and
2. The maximum payoff gi that each player i can achieve by unilaterally deviating from σ is such that
gi − uγi (σ) ≤ .
Both conditions can be verified by dynamic programming. For example, the second condition can be verified
by using the value iteration algorithm (Sutton and Barto, 1998). To do this, the deviating agent i has to be
considered as the only decision maker (optimizer). The remaining agents’ strategy profile σ−i can then be
viewed as the decision maker’s environment.
5 Theoretical Analysis
In this section, we examine the theoretical properties of Algorithm 1 for the case of mixed strategies. While
the procedure CubeSupported for pure strategies (Algorithm 2) is defined differently, mixed strategies
include pure ones. Therefore, in our theoretical analysis, we concentrate on two more general cases: mixed
strategies with no external coordination (Algorithm 1 with CubeSupported given by Algorithm 3) and
mixed strategies with public correlation (Algorithm 1 with CubeSupported given by Algorithm 4).
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Input: C, a set of hypercubes, such that W is their union; v ∈W , a payoff profile.
1: Find a hypercube c ∈ C, which v belongs to; set Q← {c} and q0 ← c;
2: for each player i do
3: Find wi = minw∈W wi and a hypercube ci ∈ C, which wi belongs to;
4: Set Q← Q ∪ {ci};
5: Set f ← ∅ 7→ ×i ∆(Ai);
6: Set τ ← ∅ 7→ C.
7: loop
8: if Q = ∅ then
9: return M ≡ (Q, q0, f, τ).
10: Pick a hypercube q ∈ Q, for which f(q) is not defined.
11: Apply the procedure CubeSupported(q) and obtain a (mixed) action profile α and continuation
payoff profiles w(a) for all a ∈ ×iAαii .
12: Define f(q) ≡ α.
13: for each a ∈ ×iAαii do
14: Find a hypercube c ∈ C, which w(a) belongs to, set Q← Q ∪ {c};
15: Define τ(q, a) ≡ c.
16: for each i and each ai ∈ (A\Aαii )×j∈N\{i} Aαii do
17: Define τ(q, ai) ≡ ci.
Algorithm 5: Algorithm for constructing an automaton M that approximately induces the given payoff
profile v.
Theorem 2. For any repeated game, discount factor γ and approximation factor , (1) Algorithm 1 termi-
nates in finite time, (2) C contains at least one hypercube, and (3) for all c ∈ C, Algorithm 5 terminates in
finite time and returns a finite automaton M that satisfies:
1. The strategy profile σ implemented by M induces the payoff profile v ≡ uγ(σ), such that, for all i,
oci − vi ≤ ,
and
2. The maximum payoff gi that each player i can achieve by unilaterally deviating from σ is such that
gi − vi ≤ .
The proof of Theorem 2 relies on the following lemmas.
Lemma 1. At any point of execution of Algorithm 1, C contains at least one hypercube.
Proof. According to Nash (1950a), any stage-game has at least one equilibrium. Let v be a payoff profile
of a certain Nash equilibrium in the stage-game. For the hypercube c that contains v, the procedure
CubeSupported will always return True, because for any γ, v satisfies the two conditions of Equation (4),
with w′ = w = v and α being a mixed action profile that induces v. Therefore, c will never be withdrawn.
Lemma 2. An iteration of Algorithm 1, such that NoCubeWithdrawn is True, will be reached in finite
time.
Proof. Because the number of hypercubes (and, therefore, the number of clusters) is finite, the procedure
CubeSupported given by Algorithm 3 will terminate in finite time. The same is true for CubeSupported
given by Algorithm 4. For a constant l, the set C is finite and contains at most d(r¯ − r)/le elements.
Therefore, and according to Lemma 1, after a finite time, there will be an iteration of Algorithm 1, such
that for all c ∈ C, CubeSupported(c) returns True.
Lemma 3. Let C be the set of hypercubes at the end of a certain iteration of Algorithm 1, such that
NoCubeWithdrawn is True. For all c ∈ C, Algorithm 5 terminates in finite time and returns a complete
finite automaton.
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Proof. By observing the definition of Algorithm 5, the proof follows from the fact that the number of
hypercubes and, therefore, the possible number of the automaton states is finite. Furthermore, the definition
of the automaton will be complete, because the fact that NoCubeWithdrawn is True implies that for
each hypercube c ∈ C, there is a mixed action α and a continuation payoff profile w belonging to a certain
hypercube c′ ∈ C. Consequently, for each state q of the automaton, the functions f(q) and τ(q) will be
defined.
Lemma 4. Let C be the set of hypercubes at the end of a certain iteration of Algorithm 1, such that
NoCubeWithdrawn is True. Let l be the current value of the hypercube side length. For every c ∈ C, the
strategy profile σ, implemented by the automaton M that starts in c, induces the payoff profile v ≡ uγ(M),
such that, for all i, oci − vi ≤ γl1−γ .
Proof. When player i is following the strategy prescribed by the automaton constructed by Algorithm 5, this
process can be reflected by an equilibrium graph, as the one shown in Figure 6. Because for all hypercubes c
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Figure 6: Equilibrium graph for player i. The graph represents the initial state followed by a non-cyclic
sequence of states (nodes 1 to Z) followed by a cycle of X states (nodes Z + 1 to Z + X). The labels over
the nodes are the immediate expected payoffs collected by player i in the corresponding states.
behind the states of the automaton, CubeSupported returns True, we have:
(1.1) o1i ≤ (1− γ)r1i + γw1i ≤ o1i + l,
(1.2) o2i ≤ w1i ≤ o2i + l,
(2.1) o2i ≤ (1− γ)r2i + γw2i ≤ o2i + l,
(2.2) o3i ≤ w2i ≤ o3i + l,
. . .
(Z.1) oZi ≤ (1− γ)rZi + γwZi ≤ oZi + l,
(Z.2) oZ+1i ≤ wZi ≤ oZ+1i + l,
(Z+1.1) oZ+1i ≤ (1− γ)rZ+1i + γwZ+1i ≤ oZi + l,
(Z+1.2) oZ+2i ≤ wZ+1i ≤ oZ+2i + l,
. . .
(Z+X.1) oZ+Xi ≤ (1− γ)rZ+Xi + γwZ+Xi ≤ oZ+Xi + l,
(Z+X.2) oZ+1i ≤ wZ+Xi ≤ oZ+1i + l,
(5)
where oqi , r
q
i and w
q
i stand respectively for (i) the payoff of player i in the origin of the hypercube behind
the state q, (ii) the immediate expected payoff of player i for playing according to fi(q) or for deviating
inside the support of fi(q), and (iii) the continuation promise payoff of player i for playing according to the
equilibrium strategy profile in state q.
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The following development only uses the inequalities of Equation (5), one by one. It starts with inequal-
ity (Z+1):
oZ+1i ≤ (1− γ)rZ+1i + γwZ+1i
〈By inequality (Z+1.2)〉
≤ (1− γ)rZ+1i + γ(oZ+2i + l)
〈By inequality (Z+2.1)〉
≤ (1− γ)rZ+1i + γ
(
(1− γ)rZ+2i + γwZ+2i
)
+ γl
〈By inequality (Z+2.2)〉
≤ (1− γ)rZ+1i + γ(1− γ)rZ+2i + γ2oZ+3i + γl
. . . (6)
〈By inequality (Z+X.2)〉
≤ (1− γ)
X∑
x=1
γx−1rZ+xi + γ
XoZ+1i + γ
X∑
x=1
γx−1l (7)
Denote by gAi the long-term expected non-normalized payoff for player i for passing through the cycle A of
the equilibrium graph infinitely often.
gAi =
X∑
x=1
γx−1rZ+xi + γ
XgAi (8)
=
∑X
z=1 γ
x−1rZ+xi
1− γX . (9)
The property of the infinite sum of the geometric series allows us to write:
X∑
x=1
γx−1l =
(1− γX)l
1− γ . (10)
From Equations (6-10) it follows that,
oZ+1 ≥ (1− γ)gAi +
γl
1− γ . (11)
Using inequalities (1.1 - Z.2) of Equation (5), the following development is possible:
〈By inequality (1.1)〉
o1i ≤ (1− γ)r1i + γw1i
〈By inequality (1.2)〉
≤ (1− γ)r1i + γ(o2i + l)
〈By inequality (2.1)〉
≤ (1− γ)r1i + γ
(
(1− γ)r2i + γw2i
)
+ γl
〈By inequality (2.2)〉
≤ (1− γ)r1i + γ(1− γ)r2i + γ2(o3i + l) + γl
. . . (12)
〈By inequality (Z.2)〉
≤ (1− γ)
Z∑
z=1
γz−1rzi + γ
ZoZ+1i + γ
Z∑
z=1
γz−1l
(13)
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From Equations (11) and (12) it follows that,
o1i ≤ (1− γ)
(
Z∑
z=1
γz−1rzi + γ
ZgAi
)
+
γl
1− γ . (14)
Denote by gBi the long-term expected (normalized) payoff for player i for passing through the equilibrium
graph (graph B in Figure 7a) infinitely often. Observe that,
gBi ≡ (1− γ)
(
Z∑
z=1
γz−1rzi + γ
ZgAi
)
.
Therefore,
o0i − gBi ≤
γl
1− γ .
Lemma 5. Let C be the set of hypercubes at the end of a certain iteration of Algorithm 1, such that
NoCubeWithdrawn is True. Let l be the current value of the hypercube side length. For every c ∈ C,
the maximum gain gi that each player i can achieve by unilaterally deviating from the strategy profile σ
implemented by an automaton M that starts in c and induces the payoff profile v ≡ uγ(M) is such that
gi − vi ≤ 2l1−γ .
Proof. To prove the lemma, one has to bound the maximum gain of a deviation that starts in an arbitrary
state of an automaton. Consider two deviation graphs for player i depicted in Figure 7. A deviation graph
1
0
2 ... L
0
iBR
1
ir
2
ir
L
iBR
A
B
0
0
iBR
(a) (b)
Figure 7: Deviation graphs for player i. (a) A generic deviation graph for player i. The graph represents
the initial deviation state (node 0) followed by a transition into the punishment state (node 1) followed by
a number of in-equilibrium (or, otherwise, inside-the-support deviation) states (nodes 1 to L − 1) followed
by the subsequent out-of-the-support deviation state (node L). (b) A particular, one state deviation graph,
where the only deviation state is the punishment state for player i. The labels over the nodes are the
immediate expected payoffs collected by player i in the corresponding states.
for player i is a finite graph, which reflects the optimal behavior for player i assuming that the behavior of
the other players is fixed and is given by an automaton returned by Algorithm 5. The nodes of the deviation
graph correspond to the states of the automaton. The labels over the nodes are the immediate expected
payoffs collected by player i in the corresponding states. A generic deviation graph for player i (Figure 7a)
is a deviation graph that has one cyclic and one non-cyclic part. In the cyclic part (subgraph A), player i
follows the equilibrium strategy or deviations take place inside the support of the prescribed mixed actions
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(nodes 1 to L− 1, with node 1 corresponding to the punishment state2 for player i). In the last node of the
cyclic part (node L), an out-of-the-support deviation takes place. The non-cyclic part of the generic deviation
graph contains a single node corresponding to the state, where the initial out-of-the-support deviation of
player i from the SPE strategy profile occurs. If the state of the initial deviation of player i is itself the
punishment state for player i, then the deviation graph will look as shown in Figure 7b.
The present proof only considers the generic deviation graph (Figure 7a); the proof for the particular
cases, like that of Figure 7b, can be obtained by analogy, and, because they bring the same result, we omit
it here. Consider first the subgraph A of the generic deviation graph. Because, for all hypercubes c behind
the states of the automaton, CubeSupported returns True, we have:
(1.0) o1i ≤ wi ≤ o1i + l,
(1.1) o1i ≤ (1− γ)r1i + γw1i ≤ o1i + l,
(1.2) o2i ≤ w1i ≤ o2i + l,
(2.1) o2i ≤ (1− γ)r2i + γw2i ≤ o2i + l,
(2.2) o3i ≤ w2i ≤ o3i + l,
. . .
(Z.1) oZi ≤ (1− γ)rZi + γwZi ≤ oZi + l,
(Z.2) (1− γ)rZi + γwZi − (1− γ)BRZi − γwi ≥ 0,
(15)
where oqi , r
q
i and w
q
i stand respectively for (i) the payoff of player i in the origin of the hypercube behind
the state q, (ii) the immediate expected payoff of player i for playing according to fi(q) or for deviating
inside the support of fi(q), and (iii) the continuation promise payoff of player i for playing according to the
equilibrium strategy profile in state q.
The following development only uses the inequalities of Equation (15), one by one. It starts with inequal-
ity (1.1):
o1i ≥ (1− γ)r1i + γw1i − l
〈By inequality (1.2)〉
≥ (1− γ)r1i + γo2i − l
〈By inequality (2.1)〉
≥ (1− γ)r1i + γ
(
(1− γ)r2i + γw2i − l
)− l
〈By inequality (2.2)〉
≥ (1− γ)r1i + γ(1− γ)r2i + γ2o3i − γl − l
. . .
〈By inequalities (3.1) to (Z-1.1)〉
≥ (1− γ)
Z−1∑
z=1
γz−1rz + γZ−1oZ − γ
Z−1∑
z=1
γz−1l
〈By inequality (Z.1)〉
≥ (1− γ)
Z−1∑
z=1
γz−1rz + γZ−1
(
(1− γ)rZi + γwZi − l
)− γ Z−1∑
z=1
γz−1l
〈By inequality (Z.2)〉
≥ (1− γ)
Z−1∑
z=1
γz−1rz + γZ−1
(
(1− γ)BRZi + γwi − l
)− γ Z−1∑
z=1
γz−1l
〈By inequality (1.0)〉
≥ (1− γ)
(
Z−1∑
z=1
γz−1rz + γZ−1BRZi
)
+ γZo1i − γ
Z∑
z=1
γz−1l. (16)
2The punishment state for player i is the automaton state, which is based on the hypercube that contains a payoff profile v,
such that vi = wi.
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Denote by gAi the long-term expected non-normalized payoff of player i for passing through the cycle A of
the generic deviation graph infinitely often:
gAi =
Z−1∑
z=1
γz−1rzi + γ
Z−1BRZi + γ
ZgAi (17)
=
∑Z−1
z=1 γ
z−1rzi + γ
Z−1BRZi
1− γZ . (18)
The property of the infinite sum of the geometric series permits us to write:
Z∑
z=1
γz−1l =
(1− γZ)l
1− γ . (19)
From Equations (16-19) it follows that
o1 ≥ (1− γ)gAi −
γl
1− γ . (20)
Furthermore, we have,
(1.1) (1− γ)r0i + γw0i − (1− γ)BR0i − γwi ≥ 0,
(1.2) o0i ≤ (1− γ)r0i + γw0i ≤ o0i + l. (21)
The following development is possible:
〈By inequality (1.1) of Equation (21)〉
(1− γ)r0i + γw0i ≥ (1− γ)BR0i + γwi
〈By inequality (1.2) of Equation (21)〉
o0i ≥ (1− γ)BR0i + γwi − l
〈By inequality (1.0) of Equation (15)〉
≥ (1− γ)BR0i + γo1i + γl − l (22)
From Equations (20) and (22) it follows that
o0i ≥ (1− γ)BR0i + γ
(
(1− γ)gAi −
γl
1− γ
)
+ γl − l. (23)
Denote by gBi the long-term expected (normalized) payoff of player i for following the generic deviation graph
(graph B in Figure 7a). Observe that,
gBi ≡ (1− γ)BR0i + γ(1− γ)gAi .
Therefore,
gBi − o0i ≤
γ2l
1− γ − γl + l.
Finally, by Lemma 4, starting from the state that corresponds to the node 0 of the generic deviation graph,
the payoff profile v, induced by the automaton, satisfies: o0i ≤ γl1−γ + vi. Therefore,
gBi − vi ≤
γ2l
1− γ +
γl
1− γ − γl + l
≤ 2l
1− γ .
Lemma 6. Algorithm 1 terminates in finite time.
Proof. The hypercube side length l is reduced by half every time that no hypercube was withdrawn by the
end of an iteration of the algorithm. Therefore, and by Lemma 2, any given value of l will be reached after a
finite time. By Lemmas 4 and 5, Algorithm 1, in the worst case, terminates whenever l becomes lower than
or equal to (1−γ)2 .
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L M H
L 10, 10 3, 15 0, 7
M 15, 3 7, 7 −4, 5
H 7, 0 5,−4 −15,−15
R P S
R 0, 0 −1, 1 1,−1
P 1,−1 0, 0 −1, 1
S −1, 1 1,−1 0, 0
(a) (b)
O F
O 1, 2 0, 0
F 0, 0 2, 1
A B
A 1, 0 2, 1
B 0, 3 3, 2
(c) (d)
Figure 8: Four game matrices: (a) Duopoly game, (b) Rock, Paper, Scissors, (c) Battle of the Sexes and
(d) Game with no pure action Nash equilibrium in stage-game.
6 Experimental Results
In this section, we present several significant experimental results for a number of well-known games. These
are Prisoner’s Dilemma (Figure 1), Duopoly (Figure 8a), Rock, Paper, Scissors (Figure 8b), Battle of the
Sexes (Figure 8c), and a game with no stage-game pure action equilibrium (Figure 8d). For these games,
certain equilibrium properties are known or can be readily analytically verified.
The graphs in Figure 9 reflect, for three different values of the discount factor, the evolution of the set of
SPE payoff profiles computed by Algorithm 1 for the case of mixed strategies with public correlation in the
repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma. Here and below, the vertical and the horizontal axes of each graph correspond
respectively to the payoffs of the first and the second players. The upper and lower limits of each axis are
given respectively by r¯ and r. The numbers under the graphs reflect the algorithm’s iterations. The red
(darker) regions on a graph reflect the hypercubes that remain in the set C by the end of the corresponding
iteration. One can see in Figure 9a that when γ is sufficiently large, the algorithm maintains a set that
converges towards the set F ∗ of feasible and individually rational payoff profiles, the largest possible set of
SPE payoff profiles. On the other hand, in Figure 9c, one can see that when γ is close enough to 0 the set of
SPE payoff profiles converges, as expected, towards the point (0, 0) that corresponds to the Nash equilibrium
of the stage-game: a strategy profile that prescribes playing D at every repeated game period.
Rock, Paper, Scissors (RPC) is a symmetrical zero-sum game. In the repeated RPC game, the point (0, 0)
is the only possible SPE payoff profile, regardless of the discount factor. This payoff profile can be realized
by a stationary strategy profile prescribing to each player to sample actions from a uniform distribution.
The graphs in Figure 10 certify the correctness of Algorithm 1 in this case.
Battle of the Sexes (BoS) is the game that has two pure action stage-game equilibria, (O,O) and (F, F ),
with payoff profiles respectively (1, 2) and (2, 1). The game also has one mixed action stage-game equilibrium
with payoff profile (2/3, 2/3). When γ is sufficiently close to 0, the set of SPE payoff profiles computed by
Algorithm 1 converges towards these three points (Figure 11b), which is the expected behavior. As γ grows,
the set of SPE payoff profiles becomes larger (Figure 11a). We also ascertained that when the value of γ
becomes sufficiently close to 1, the set of SPE payoff profiles converges towards F ∗ and eventually includes
the point (3/2, 3/2). The latter point is interesting in that it maximizes the Nash product (Nash, 1950b).
It was particularly interesting for us to see whether, when applied to the repeated Duopoly game (Fig-
ure 8a), Algorithm 1 for pure strategies preserves the point (10, 10) in the set of SPE payoff profiles. Abreu
(1988) showed that this point can only make part of the set of SPE payoff profiles, if γ > 4/7. In our experi-
ments, we observed that for  = 0.01, the point (10, 10) indeed remains in the set of SPE payoff profiles, when
4/7 < γ < 1. Moreover, the payoff profile (0, 0) of the optimal penal code, which was proposed by Abreu
(1988) as the profile of punishment strategies, does also remain there (Figures 12a and b). Algorithm 1 also
returns an automaton that induces a strategy profile that generates the payoff profile (10, 10). Interestingly,
this automaton induces a strategy profile, which is equivalent to the optimal penal code based strategy profile
proposed by Abreu (1988). To the best of our knowledge, this the first time that optimal penal code based
strategies, which so far were only proven to exist (in the general case), were algorithmically computed.
Another experiment was conducted with the game that does not possess any pure action stationary
equilibrium (Figure 8d). In such games, for lower discount factors, the algorithm of Judd et al. (2003), that
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(a) γ = 0.7,  = 0.01
2 4 6 8 10 20
(b) γ = 0.3,  = 0.01
2 3 5 7 9 12
(c) γ = 0.05,  = 0.01
Figure 9: The evolution of the set of SPE payoff profiles computed by Algorithm 1 for mixed strategies
with public correlation in the repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma. The numbers under the graphs reflect the
algorithm’s iterations. The red (darker) regions denote the hypercubes that remain in the set C by the end
of the corresponding iteration.
5 10 15 20 25 33
Figure 10: The evolution of the set of SPE payoff profiles computed by Algorithm 1 for mixed action with
public correlation in the repeated Rock, Paper, Scissors with γ = 0.7 and  = 0.01.
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(a) γ = 0.45,  = 0.01
2 4 6 8 10 15
(b) γ = 0.05,  = 0.01
Figure 11: The evolution of the set of SPE payoff profiles computed by Algorithm 1 for mixed actions without
public correlation in the repeated Battle of the Sexes.
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Figure 12: SPE payoff profiles in repeated Duopoly game computed by Algorithm 1 for pure strategies with
γ = 0.6 and  = 0.01. (a) The evolution of the set of SPE payoff profiles through different algorithm’s
iterations. (b) Abreu’s optimal penal code solution is contained within the set of SPE payoff profiles.
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γ ∈ [0.01, 0.4] γ = 0.45 γ = 0.5 γ = 0.7 γ = 0.9
Figure 13: The sets of SPE payoff profiles computed in the repeated game from Figure 8d with  = 0.01 for
different values of the discount factor.
 l Iterations Time
0.025 0.008 55 1750
0.050 0.016 41 770
0.100 0.031 28 165
0.200 0.063 19 55
0.300 0.125 10 19
0.500 0.250 5 15
Table 1: The performance of Algorithm 1 in the repeated Battle of the Sexes for different values of the ap-
proximation factor . The second column represents the hypercube side length l at the end of the algorithm’s
execution; the third column contains the number of iterations until convergence; the last column contains
the overall execution time in seconds.
can only compute pure action strategy and payoff profiles, is incapable of returning any SPE point. On the
other hand, Algorithm 1 does return a non-empty SPE set for the whole range of values of the discount
factor (Figure 13).
Finally, the numbers in Table 1 demonstrate how different values of the approximation factor  impact
the performance of Algorithm 1 (with clusters) in terms of (i) number of iterations until convergence and
(ii) time spent by the algorithm to compute a solution. The game used in this experiment is the repeated
Battle of the Sexes from Figure 8c.
7 Discussion
We have presented an approach for approximately computing the set of subgame-perfect equilibrium (SPE)
payoff profiles in repeated games and for deriving strategies implementable as finite automata and capable
of approximately inducing those payoff profiles. To our knowledge, this is the first time that both these goals
are achieved simultaneously.
Furthermore, for the setting where no coordination during the game-play is possible, our algorithm returns
the richest set of SPE payoff profiles among all existing algorithms for repeated games. More precisely, it
returns a set that contains all stationary Nash equilibrium payoff profiles, all non-stationary pure SPE
payoff profiles, and a subset of non-stationary mixed SPE payoff profiles. In a case where a certain level of
coordination can be assumed, such as the availability of a public correlating device, our algorithm returns a
set containing all SPE payoff profiles, while satisfying the necessary approximation properties.
In this paper, we adopted a usual assumption that the discount factor, γ, is the same for all players.
However, our algorithms can readily be modified to incorporate player specific discount factors. Furthermore,
for simplicity of presentation, we assumed that the hypercube side length, l, is the same for all players. This
is also not a strict requirement; it is straightforward to generalize all algorithms and theoretical results to
the case of player specific hypercube side lengths.
One formulation of the procedure CubeSupported assumes the presence of a source of a commonly
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observed random signal (public correlating device). A natural question would be why not aiming, in that
case, at computing a richer set of subgame perfect correlated equilibrium (SPCE) payoff profiles (Aumann,
1987). Indeed, several algorithms for computing the set of SPCE payoff profiles and the strategies to achieve
them have recently been proposed (Murray and Gordon, 2007; Dermed and Isbell, 2009). Our algorithm can
also be transformed into one for approximating the set of SPCE payoff profiles. Indeed, in that case, the
mathematical programming problem for the CubeSupported procedure will be even simpler than that for
SPE. This is due to the fact that for computing a correlated equilibrium, one has to find a unique probability
distribution for players’ action profiles, and not a profile of probability distributions whose product enforces
equilibrium.
However, in order to implement correlated equilibria in practice, one has to have a reliable third-party
mediator that can send private signals to the players before every repeated game stage. Furthermore, at
every period, the signals coming to the players have to be thrown from a specific distribution, different
at different repeated game stages. In the presence of communication, the mediator can be replaced by a
special communication protocol (Dodis et al., 2000). Nevertheless, each stage of the repeated game has to
be preceded by a round of communication in order to simulate the mediator.
On the other hand, SPE equilibria computed using Algorithm 1 with the CubeSupported procedure
given by Algorithms 2 or 3 neither require a mediating party nor a communication. Furthermore, the
assumption of public correlation, adopted in order to implement Algorithm 4, only requires the presence of
a source of a (constant) uniformly distributed signal that has to be observed by all players only at certain
repeated game periods. This is a significantly less restrictive assumption than the one that has to be satisfied
for implementing correlated equilibria in practice.
Algorithm 1 with the CubeSupported procedure given by Algorithm 2 can be straightforwardly ex-
tended to stochastic games while preserving the linearity of the mathematical programming problem of the
CubeSupported procedure. In more general cases, however, the existence of multiple states in the envi-
ronment is a source of non-linearity. The latter property, together with the presence of integer variables,
require special techniques to solve the problem; this constitutes subject for future research.
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